LAUNCHING RECONCILIATION IN SOMALIA

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Summary

A reconciliation process is key to strengthening the Somali state. Political stabilisation, state-building and agreeing the constitution should all be based on the outcomes of a pertinent reconciliation process. If not, efforts to stabilise Somalia are unlikely to be durable.

Reconciliation has persistently been omitted from past peace processes, and has essentially been replaced by power-sharing arrangements, neglecting the interests and grievances of the Somali population. The continuance of violence in Somalia's regions and within the capital itself, shows that there is a serious need for reconciliation. Violence is by no means only a reflection of the conflict with Al-Shabaab and the manifestation of terrorism. It also reflects grievances and feuds that have a long history and still need to be resolved.

While a solution to the political crisis in Somalia requires changes to the constitution, achieving this cannot be done solely on the basis of technocratic inputs. A new constitution must reflect the outcomes and agreements made through a broad reconciliation process. Without bringing the population firmly behind the national security plan, it will be very difficult to defeat Al-Shabaab as well as to generate sufficient security.

The first step in a reconciliation process would be to bring Somalis together to determine the way in which key issues are addressed, which is likely to involve forgiveness or truth and justice. Beyond this, the agenda of the reconciliation process can be derived from bottom-up, participatory action research (PAR) methodologies in order to identify grievances and the principles for their resolution.

The overall recommendation is that the UN and international community support Somalia in finally launching a truth and reconciliation process. It should be driven by Somalis themselves, preferably through an independent facilitation committee composed of eminent elders, cultural personalities and academics without vested political interests in the process. This facilitation committee could then be coupled with "The Elders" founded by Nelson Mandela, to provide guidance and international connections. It is recommended that the reconciliation process is established from the ground up, starting at the district level, continuing at the regional level, to be finalised at the national level.

Soo Koobid

Geedi-socodka dib-u-heshiisiinta wuxuu muhiim u yahay xoojinta dowladnimada Soomaaliya. Xasiloonida siyaasadeed, dowlad-dhisidda iyo in lagu heshiiyo dastuurka waa in dhamaantood lagu

saleeyo natiijada kasoo baxda geedi-socodka dib-u-heshiisiinta ee khuseeya arrimahaas. Haddii taas la waayo, waxaan la hubin in dadaallada xasilinta ay sii waari karaan.

[Qodobka] dib-u-heshiisiinta ayaa si joogto ah looga saarayay geedi-socodyadii hore ee nabadaynta, waxaana si muuqata loogu bedelayay habka awood-qeybsiga, iyadoo la iska indha-tirayo danaha iyo cabashooyinka dadka Soomaaliyeed. Colaadaha kasii socda gobollada Soomaaliya iyo weliba caasimadda ayaa caddeyn u ah in si dhab ah loogu baahanyahay dib-u-heshiisiin. Colaadda lagama dhaxlo wax aan ka ahayn colaado lagala kulmo Al-Shabaab iyo in ay soo if-baxdo argagixisanimo. Sidoo kale, waxay ka turjumaysaa cabashooyin iyo colaado muddo dheer soo jiitamayay oo weli u baahan in la xalliyo.

Maadaama xallinta qalalaasaha siyaasadeed ee Soomaaliya ka jira uu u baahanyahay in is-bedel lagu sameeyo dastuurka, ayaa arrintaan waxaan wax looga qaban karin talooyin talooyin farsamo (aqoonyahan) oo kaliya. Dastuurka cusub [ee lasoo saari doono] waa inay ka muuqdaan natiijooyinka iyo heshiisyada lagu gaaro geedi-socod dib-u-heshiisiinta oo ballaaran. Haddii aan bulshada si dhab ah looga qaybgelin [oo aanay u taageerin] qorshaha amniga qaranka, waxaa aad u adkaan toonta in la jebiyo Al-Shabaab iyo weliba in la dhaliyo amni buuxa.

Talaabta ugu horreysa ee geedi-socodka dib-u-heshiisiinta wuxuu noqonaya in la isku keeno dadka Soomaaliyeed si ay u go'aamiyaan waddada loo mari karo xal u helidda arrimaha ugu muhiimsan, oo sida la filayo ay kamid noqon doonaan is-cafin ama in si run iyo cadaalad ku dheehantahay loo wada hadlo. Intaas wixii ka dambeeya, ajendaha geedi-socodka dib-u-heshiisiinta waxaa lagasoo dheehan karaa hababka cilmi-baarista laga wada qayb qaato (participatory action research) ee hoos lagasoo billaabo lana gaarsiiyo meel sare si loo garto cabashiiyinka iyo mabaadi'dii lagu xallin lahaa.

Talo soo-jeedinta guud waa in Qaramada Midoobay iyo saaxiibada caalamku ay Soomaaliya ka caawiyaan sidii ay ugu dambeyn u guda geli lahayd geedi-socod dib-u-heshiisiin iyo run isku-sheegid. Waa in hawshani ay garwadeen ka noqdaan isla dadka Soomaaliyeed, iyadoo la door bidayo iyo loo maro gudii madaxbanaan oo fududeeya hawsha kana kooban odayaal dhaqameed caan ah, dadka magaca ku leh dhaqanka iyo aqoonyahanno iyadoo aan dano siyaasadeed lagu larin geedi-socodka. Guddiga fududeynta waxaa lagu lammaanin karaa [lagu kaabi karaa] "Odayaasha" oo ah urur uu curiyay Nelson Mandela, si ay u hagaan uguna xiriiriyaan caalamka. Waxaa lagu talinayaa in geedi-socodka dib-u-heshiisiinta lagasoo billaabo qeybaha hoose [ee buulshada] oo kor loo sooqaado, iyadoo lagasoo billaabayo heer degmo, lana sii wedayo ilaa heer gobol, si loogusoo gabagabeeyo heer qaran.

The Need for Reconciliation

This briefing paper explains why it is necessary to launch a bottom-up truth and reconciliation process in Somalia.[1] Reconciliation has persistently been omitted from past peace processes. Instead, power-sharing arrangements between elites and state-building efforts have been prioritised, largely neglecting the interests and grievances of the Somali population.[2] There is therefore a need to move beyond power-sharing arrangements between illegitimate and unrepresentative elites. Reconciliation is both long overdue and essential if Somalia is to be stabilised and the Somali state rebuilt.

From a Weak to a Stronger State

Reconciliation is vital if Somalia is to become a stronger state. According to the political scientist Barry Buzan's theory about what constitutes a strong state, there needs to be a strong correspondence

between three bases of a state: people and territory, the idea of the state and the institutional base.[3] Without strong correspondence between these three bases, a state will likely be dysfunctional and weak. The two figures below show how Buzan's theory may be applied to Somalia. The weaknesses of the current Somali state-building process are elaborated in subsequent sections of this paper.

Weak and Strong State Theory as Guidance:

STRONG STATE THEORY (free after Barry Buzan)

IDEA OF THE STATE

correspondance

correspondance

PEACE as a result of wide consensual acceptance of the basic IDEA of the STATE

PEOPLE TERRITORY

correspondance

INSTITUTIONAL BASE

WEAKNESS ES OF SOMALI STATEBUILDING

IDEA OF THE STATE

- Ethnic identity disputed (pan-somali nationalis)
- Religious identity disputed (Sufi vs Salafism, political Islam etc.)
- Social structure weakly reflected in state (incl. clan as socio-political basis)
- People spread across borders
- Lack of political representation

- Constitution provisional Insufficient consensus on political structures and institutional basis (secularism, sharia etc.)

- Lack of trust in state institutions/ public sector
- Including police, security forces and judiciary
- Including corruption
- State unable to protect sovereign territorial integrity
- Lack of political representation

- Institution building prior to constitutional consensus

correspondance

PEOPLE TERRITORY

correspondance

INSTITUTIONAL BASE

Reconciliation is the most effective way to achieve stronger correspondence between the three bases of the state. This paper considers key issues that only a reconciliation process can address, including the constitution, federalisation, security and the political crisis. These issues are not intended to pre-empt any given reconciliation process, but are examples of issues that could be key points of departure for a reconciliation agenda. The actual issues to be addressed should be determined by Somalis themselves in the course of the process.

Grievances That Remain: Identity, Resource and Land Conflicts

The continuance of violence in Somalia's regions and within the capital itself shows that there is a major need for reconciliation. Such violence is not only a reflection of the conflict with Al-Shabaab and the manifestation of terrorism. It also reflects grievances and feuds that have a long history and still need to be resolved. Al-Shabaab and the armed Islamist insurgencies understand these dynamics very well – and exploit them effectively.

Unfortunately, the dominant discourse in government and international communiqués and official documents focuses on the threat posed by Al-Shabaab, but the conflict in Somalia is far more complex. Furthermore, the idea that a military approach alone is sufficient is not only flawed, but risks creating a durable conflict rather than a durable peace. Grievances from the 1990-1993 civil war remain, and as noted by the UN Monitoring Group report of 2014, the issues often resurface and turn violent.[4]

The ethnic identity of the Somalis (Somalinimo) is in fact disputed, as is the hegemonic identity of pastoralists, which is superimposed on most of the populations of southern Somalia.[5] However, one of the biggest population groups in Somalia – the Digil/Mirifle, in particular the Rahanwein group – is quite distinct from the pastoralist clans of the Darood, Hawiye, Dir and Isaaq.[6]

The so-called "minorities", often referred to as "Bantu",[7] have been victimised and in many cases practically enslaved by the warring pastoralist clans seeking to exploit the agriculturalist Bantu and their fertile land on the banks and deltas of the Jubba and Shabelle rivers.[8] The suppression of these

"minorities" continues today and perpetuates major grievances.[9] Other minority groups have also experienced persecution and suppression. This includes the "Benadiri", "Barawaani" and "Bajuun", who have mixed Arabic descent and heritage, and the so-called "Midgan" – a derogatory term for the people generally identified by their occupations as craftsmen or artisans – who refer to themselves as Gaboye. All these "minorities" have legitimate grievances, and continue to be exploited by Al-Shabaab.

It is therefore crucial to diversify the identity of the "Somalinimo", to include and emphasise the cultural differences and ethnic identities that exist in Somalia. This should be reflected clearly in the Somali constitution, including the existence of more than one Somali language. Reconciliation would be the ideal path to such an understanding, and to recognition of the cultural diversity that exists. In addition to addressing grievances, a major task for reconciliation efforts is to address the persistent lack of trust between the major dominant clans, as well as between their sub-clan groups.[10]

From the early 1990s onwards Somalia became increasingly subject to an unpronounced religious war in which the traditional Somali religious identity – associated with Sufism – became disputed, often violently, by Sunni-Salafi/Wahhabi militant groups such as Al-Ittihad and in the recent years by Al-Shabaab.[11] In reaction, to prevent outright extermination, the Sufi armed themselves through the organisation of Ahlu Sunnah Wal Jama'a to establish a firm resistance and military struggle against Al-Shabaab. It is crucial to resolve this religious identity crisis, not only to end the conflict, but also to solve the constitutional deficits in terms of the religious identities of the Somali people. This can be achieved through reconciliation by seeking acceptance of and agreement about the religious diversity that exists. It should be reflected in the Somali constitution.

Another major issue, to which reconciliation can provide the principles for a solution, is the vast and complex set of disputes over land ownership and property rights. This issue has a long history, complicated by the civil war, on which The Rift Valley Institute has produced a comprehensive report.[12] A reconciliation process can, and should, involve the Somali people in determining the basic principles for solving land and property disputes.

Ending the Political Governance Crisis

The persistent political governance crisis in Somalia is rooted in the absence of a pertinent reconciliation process, and thus a constitution that does not resonate with the people. A reconciliation process is therefore necessary for achieving the new president's three key priorities: ending the political crisis, combating corruption, and defeating Al-Shabaab.[13]

Ending the Political Crisis

While a solution to the political crisis requires changing the constitution, achieving this cannot be done solely on the basis of technocratic inputs, because the outcome must correspond to the understandings, wishes and identities of the Somali people.[14] A new constitution must reflect the outcomes and agreements made through a broad reconciliation process. In other words, it cannot only be based on brokering deals with the top elite politicians and power-holders in Mogadishu and the Federal Member State capitals. State-building should ideally be based on wide popular consensus about a new national foundation manifested in the constitution.

Combating Corruption

Progress against corruption is necessary to achieve stabilisation, because state capture and corruption undermine government institutions. Corruption undermines the legitimacy of elected parliamentarians, and hence also the President and the Prime Minister.[15] It underlies the persistent insecurity in Mogadishu because it enables the insurgency to infiltrate the security apparatus. A reconciliation process is a good place to start tackling corruption, because through such a process grievances concerning corruption can be articulated and recognised. A reconciliation process could seek to identify the basic principles for an effective judiciary that builds upon the various Somali justice traditions.[16] The process should also determine the principles of a truth and accountability process, about which there should be broad public agreement.

Security and Al-Shabaab

Insecurity remains a major problem in Somalia despite the progress of pro-government forces in pushing Al-Shabaab back over the past six years.[17] This is primarily because Al-Shabaab maintains an ability to operate in Mogadishu and other major towns in south-central Somalia, and still controls significant territory. Insecurity also remains a problem because "old" conflicts between clans, driven by their elites, and the grievances of suppressed groups, have not been resolved. Therefore the conflict in Somalia is much more than simply a "war against terror", in other words, against Al-Shabaab and groups allied with the so-called Islamic State.

Stabilising Somalia cannot only be achieved by military means. It takes a broader political solution involving various actors, including reconcilable elements within Al-Shabaab.[18] This is because political stabilisation depends as much on the extension, legitimacy and credibility of the state's authority and the re-establishment of the rule of law as any military operations.

The lack of basic consensus between the clans in southern Somalia is a key reason why there still is not an effective national army and the clans retain their militias.[19] Without bringing the population firmly behind the national security plan, it will be very difficult to defeat Al-Shabaab and generate sufficient security. Indeed, the best way to achieve an effective and truly national army is through a nationwide process of reconciliation.[20]

What a Reconciliation Process Could Look Like

The central proposition of this paper is that only through reconciliation is it possible to overcome the structural problems in Somali politics, move away from power-sharing arrangements and get the horse back in front of the cart in finalising the constitution. At the same time, the population can be engaged in favour of this process and take part in securitisation and stabilisation of the country.

The first step would be for Somalis to accept and support the idea of a reconciliation process and agree on the way in which disputes and grievances should be resolved, which might involve forgiveness or truth and justice.

Since there are formal governments in place, the process should be accepted by the Federal Government and Federal Member States. While these governments should participate in the process, it should not be driven by them to avoid suspicion of political manipulation. Ideally, the process should therefore be established and driven by independent committees that are not set up by or controlled by any government.

Due to negative experiences with past peace processes in Somalia, the reconciliation process must not be conflated with determining a power-sharing arrangement or with the often-used term "social reconciliation". Past processes tended to involve a narrow group of actors with no real interest in reconciliation. Any future reconciliation process must not be driven by such groups.

The multiple agendas of the reconciliation process can be established from the bottom up, based on participatory action research (PAR) methodologies that ensure popular involvement. This approach would first identify grievances and then the principles for their resolution.[21]

Principles

This section and the following sub-sections outline the principles and sequencing for the organisation and implementation of a reconciliation process in Somalia.

It is vital that the reconciliation process is not organised for the Somalis. On the contrary, the process must be driven by Somalis, organised by them and to the extent possible funded by them. If the process is only funded by international aid, the Somali interest in achieving reconciliation cannot be taken seriously.

No government should lead the process or intervene in its direction. This should be left to a reconciliation facilitation committee composed of eminent, recognised elders and other leaders from Somali communities.

To promote genuine commitment, there should be no international remuneration for participation in meetings. International aid should be limited to supporting the work of the facilitation committee.

The process should start at the grassroots level and work upwards to the regional, and then national levels. At each level, participants should determine who will represent them at the subsequent stage of the process.

Preliminary Phase

The most important and difficult challenge in the preliminary phase is the identification of the members of the reconciliation facilitation committee. The ideal option is to establish a national-level facilitation committee, based on eminent elders, cultural personalities and other individuals, who are highly respected by Somalis in general, who can be trusted not to have vested interests in politics, and who have the skills to connect various groups of society.

To reinforce the authority of the facilitation committee and promote its independent role and connections to the international community, it would be useful to link the committee with the globally eminent group of statesmen known as "The Elders".[22]

If it is not possible to establish a committee of eminent elders, the minimum requirement would be to establish a committee independent from the government to oversee the process. In past transitional arrangements, the Somali parliament nominated members of reconciliation committees. However, the experiences of these committees were not ideal, as they were often too large, inefficient and composed of members who did not have sufficient respect and authority to carry out the task. Hence, neither Parliament nor the Federal Government should nominate members of the committee because this would risk creating mistrust and a suspicion that the process has been manipulated.

A possible way forward could be a combination of the following options for identifying the members of the facilitation committee:

- Parliament sets up a small independent team, which then in a public, open and transparent process seeks to identify nominees and calls for nominations from the public within a given timeframe.
- Apply the customary practice for conflict resolution, in which high-level elders, known as *issim,* of the main clan families and the so-called "minority" groups, are brought together to set criteria for, and nominate, members.
- Bring together a group of respected peace, human rights and other civic actors, who could put forward nominations.

It may be useful to establish criteria for membership of the facilitation committee first, and then suggest candidates. This could be done in a joint conference, composed of all the above, and supported by "The Elders".

Once the facilitation committee is in place, it will need to establish an organising entity – which ideally should not be a government agency or a local private company – to organise and facilitate meetings and events. The international community could provide funding for staff and operational costs. The United Nations could do this, for instance, through UNOPS, or such support could be provided through an entirely different organisation, preferably one with greater access to the field than the UN due to its restrictive security policies. The organising entity would be responsible for assisting with the organisation of meetings and events, and reporting outcomes to the facilitation committee.

Preparatory Phase

In the preparatory phase, the facilitation committee could establish the points of departure for initiating the process. It could draft the first agendas, explore key issues, explain the process to the public, set timelines for the process and suggest sequencing of district-level conferences.
During this phase the organising entity could prepare for the PAR process by training qualified facilitators.

The facilitation committee should meet with "The Elders" to discuss the process and issues that may arise. Once the facilitation committee has developed a plan, it should be publicly announced, while the organising entity prepares for the practicalities of the implementation phase.

Implementation Phase

Due to security and practical considerations, the process cannot be carried out everywhere simultaneously. It can therefore be carried out district by district, where AMISOM is able to provide a sufficient level of security for meetings to take place. Government officials and security forces could contribute to securing key areas, but must not intervene in outcomes, interfere with or manipulate participation, or seek to shape the issues or grievances being discussed.

District by district, the first step would be to carry out an initial PAR process involving communities, to establish core narratives and identify grievances. This could ideally be carried out by the organising entity, which would present the findings to the facilitation committee.

Thereafter, it may be useful to establish traditional type oath-swearing conferences before initiating district-level conferences.[23] In these conferences, powerful armed actors and government entities, at all levels, should be required to swear that they will recognise whatever outcome and agreements the reconciliation conferences reach.

Local conferences could apply PAR methodologies to identify key conflict issues and grievances. These would then be discussed and addressed on an issue-by-issue basis, drawing on a forgiveness or truth and justice approach. Depending on what is agreed, the next step would be to determine the details of the ensuing process.

Determinations should then be recorded in a resolution, which representatives abide by at the next level of the reconciliation process. These resolutions should state whether, with respect to each issue, there is consensus for forgiveness or truth and justice. The resolutions could also record agreed positions regarding other points such as the federal political structure, fiscal issues, resource sharing, and the constitution.

The process must be flexible and iterative. Thus, it must allow for debate, and not be tightly time-constrained. Patience is a requirement. The conferences must not be limited to just one or two "town hall meetings", but allow for several meetings, and break outs, to enable the broadest possible discussions.

Once all the districts have carried out their reconciliation processes, outcomes could be compiled by the organising entity and presented to the national facilitation committee of eminent elders. They can then present all of the outcomes together in a report and set the agenda for regional-level reconciliation, in other words, at the level of Federal Member States.

Participants at this level can be representatives mandated by the district meetings. The regional-level reconciliation conferences can seek to align the district outcomes, and participants can discuss and agree on how to implement the reconciliation agenda.

These conferences should ideally discuss and confirm the outcomes from the district level, including solutions to the lack of legitimacy of the Federal Member States, as well as the recommendations for changes to the constitution, and any action that is required to reflect the outcomes of the district and ensuing reconciliation processes. As at the district level, the organising entity can compile and present reports of the outcomes to the facilitation committee.

If the various district conference outcomes are divergent and incompatible, the process could revert to the district level, with recommendations from the facilitation committee to try to obtain agreement on certain issues.

Once the regional conferences, at Federal Member State level, are completed, the national level reconciliation conference should then be launched. Participants would be mandated by regional conferences, and include members of Parliament and the Federal Government. The outcome reports from the regional level can then be presented by the facilitation committee for discussion and final agreement on how to implement the reconciliation agreements.

Finalisation Phase

Based on the final agreements on how to implement the reconciliation outcomes, the finalisation phase will involve at least the following elements:

- A session of the Federal Parliament that formally endorses the final agreements, and if agreed upon, the necessary legislation for the implementation of an eventual truth and justice process, and the necessary decisions on amendments to the constitution.
- Parliament and government should determine and establish the commissions or courts that might be required to finalise the reconciliation process.

Conclusions

A reconciliation process in Somalia is essential to build a stronger state. In other words, stabilising Somalia, state-building and agreeing on a permanent constitution should be based on the outcomes of a genuine national reconciliation process. If not, those efforts will remain at a high risk of failure.

The Somali constitution, provision of security, resource sharing and a means of ensuring accountability need to be based on a new consensus – a new social contract among the Somalis, which only can be achieved through a wide reconciliation process. A reconciliation process from the bottom up has the potential of increasing security by involving communities in creating a common foundation for building a new, stronger Somali state.

Recommendations

The UN and international community should support the launch of a reconciliation process in Somalia. It is of vital importance that the process is driven by Somalis, and preferably through an independent facilitation committee. This should be composed of eminent elders and distinguished individuals who do not have vested political interests in the process. The facilitation committee should be coupled with "The Elders", founded by Nelson Mandela, which would advise and support the committee. It is recommended that the reconciliation process works from the bottom up, starting at district levels, continuing at regional levels, to be finalised at the national level.

Talo Bixin

Qaramada Midoobay iyo beesha caalamku waa inay taageeraan sidii Soomaaliya looga daah-furi lahaa geedi-socod dib-u-heshiisiin. Waxaa muhiimad gaar ah leh in geedi-socodka ay garwadeen ka noqdaan dadka Soomaaliyeed, waxaana la door-bidayaa in loo maro guddi madaxbanaan oo hawsha fudueeya. Guddigan wuxuu ka koobnaanayaa odayaal dhaqameed caan ah iyo shakhsiyaad sumcad leh oo aan wax dano siyaasadeed ah ka lehayn geedi-socodka. Guddiga waxaa lagu lamaaninayaa "Odayaalka" oo ah hay'ad uu asaasay Nelson Mandela, hay'addaas oo talo iyo taageeraba siin doonta guddiga. Waxaa lagu talinayaa in geedi-socodka dib-u-heshiisiinta lagasoo billaabo meel hoose kadibna kor loosoo qaado, iyadoo lagasoo billaabayo heer degmo, lana sii wedayo ilaa heer gobol si looguso af-jaro heer qaran.

Notes

[1] This paper does attempt to present a comprehensive, in-depth analysis. It sets out the key analytical reasons why reconciliation is still a vital requirement to solve the Somali predicament and outlines how a reconciliation process could unfold.

[2] Menkhaus et. al., *A History of Mediation in Somalia since 1988*, The Centre for Research and Dialogue, May 2009; Tobias Hagman, *Stabilization, Extraversion and Political Settlements in Somalia,* Rift Valley Institute, 2016.

[3] Barry Buzan, *People, States and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations,* ECPR Press, 1983.

[4] Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea pursuant to Security Council Resolution 2111 (2013): Somalia, 10 October 2014.

[5] This section draws upon Joakim Gundel, *The predicament of the 'Oday': The role of traditional structures in security, rights, law and development in Somalia,* November 2006.

[6] The Rahanwein speak Af-Maay, which not immediately intelligible with the "national language" of af-Maxitirii, which is the language of the predominant nomadic people the Darood, Hawiye and Isaak clans. The Rahanwein culture is agro-pastoralist, and hence in many ways different from the pastoralists.

[7] They are known as Gosha, Makane, Shiidle etc. These people also speak different languages, have quite different cultures, and are agriculturalists.

[8] Martin Hill, *No Redress: Somalia's Forgotten Minorities,* Minority Rights Group International, November 2010.

[9] These 'minority' populations are not minorities as such, as they outnumber the pastoralists in the regions they live. But the dominant clans have successfully made the international community believe in their representation of the Bantus as a minority, as their number is most likely far higher than stated in official statistics. The pastoralist clans have successfully occupied and dominated the Bantus since 1990, and still control their land. They are also systematically being prevented a representative participation in politics through the informal application of the 4.5 system, a fact that is consistently ignored by the international community. Only Minority Rights and other minority rights groups have emphasized these facts, but to no avail.

[10] This mistrust has a long history, which however, was deepened and entrenched thanks to the civil war. Hence, many Darood still have grievances over their displacement from Mogadishu and other regions, and the experience of being hunted down and killed primarily by the Hawiye militias. Clearly, this was not just a reflection of the rivalry between these two main clans, but a process initiated by their political elites who manipulated the clans for their political and military pogroms.

[11] A process sponsored by funds originating in the Arabic oil states. There are non-militant Wahabbi associated groups with significant political influence in Somalia, including Al-Islah and Dam ul-Jadiid.

[12] Warsuge, Barnes & Kiepe (eds.), *Land Matters in Mogadishu: Settlement, ownership and displacement in a contested city,* Rift Valley Institute, 2017.

[13] Abdihakim Ainte, in *Somalia: Another Paradigm Shift*?, Al Jazeera Centre for Studies, May 11 2017.

[14] As Abdihakim Ainte (op. cit.) clearly points out: "This political crisis has its roots, primarily, in Somalia's provisional constitution, which vests great power and authority in the hands of the unelected prime minister over the elected president. Second, there is a political element to the crisis. Under the current system, the political practice and culture is far more important than the constitutional rules. In the absence of effective rule of law and political parties, crises are settled through political bargaining between the stakeholders and elites. Without clear checks and balances, the provisional constitution provides both the president and prime minister with excessive power to abuse for their own gain."

[15] The prevalent corruption is evidenced elsewhere. See for instance *2016 State of Accountability in Somalia*, Marqaati, February 2017.

[16] Gundel, Berg & Ibrahim, *Political Economy of Justice in Somalia,* World Bank, 2016.

[17] AMISOM, the Somali army and other local forces such as the Ras-Kamboni and Ahlu-Sunna Wal-Jamaa now control almost all major cities and towns in southern and central Somalia, but Al-Shabaab remains all but defeated, and still controls big parts of the countryside and towns like Buale in Middle Jubba region.

[18] Furthermore, as Ainte (op. cit.) points out, the international coalition – AMISOM, US, UK and other foreign troops – have made virtually no effort to find political solution to the perpetual war and have prioritized military solutions over diplomacy. This narrow focus on counterinsurgency has created fatigue among the foreign troops.

[19] It is widely believed that Somali forces are built along clan lines and lack allegiance to the Federal Government. Moreover, they are heavily reliant on external support for salary, training and equipment. Cognisant of this, President Farmaajo has promised to improve the quality of Somalia National Army and reestablish a competent, capable, and well-disciplined national force. The recently adopted plan for a new

Somali national security architecture was an important step in that process, but requires political buy-in from the various regional administrations and other competing actors.

[20] Somaliland is a case in point, where an army was built upon the basis of reconciliation and clan consensus rather than a top-down merger of brokered de-facto "warlord" business controlled militias/security forces. See Brickhill & Bryden, *Disarming Somalia: lessons in stabilisation from a collapsed state,* Conflict, Security & Development, April 2010.

[21] There are positive precedents for the application of participatory action research methods in Somalia. See for example Allen & Gundel, *Enhancing district-level governance & accountability in Somalia: A case study on the citizen-directed negotiated accountability project,* KATUNI Consult & IAAAP, February 2017.

[22] See http://theelders.org/.

[23] Joakim Gundel, *The predicament of the 'Oday': The role of traditional structures in security, rights, law and development in Somalia,* November 2006.